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THE GUARANTEE OF SECURITY: A 
FOUNDING PRINCIPLE OF 
SOVEREIGN STATES  
One of the first historical sources of legitimacy 
for sovereign rulers was their ability to guarantee 
peace and security: in his famous Leviathan, the 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes theorized this 
renunciation by individuals of some of their 
freedom in exchange for the protection of some 
fundamental freedoms, including the right to 
live in peace. The implementation of such a 
right supposed that only the state would dispose 
of the legitimate use of force, through police 
and military forces, in order to ensure internal 
peace would prevail on the territory over which 
it ruled. In this Hobbesian approach, the social 
contract has an instrumental and practical 
justification rather than an idealistic one: instead 
of defending the greatest good – as in the 
classical view of natural law – the government 
had to guarantee the minimal good of avoiding 
death. In this shift from classical natural law to 
modern natural rights, the root of justice is the 
fundamental right of self-preservation. And this 
is so because human beings are, by nature, 
How can we reinforce internal security 
without destroying basic freedoms? This 
dilemma will become increasingly topical 
in the context of rising terrorist threats 
and in view of some of the responses 
already put in place at the national level. 
Many observers have pointed out the 
threat that these measures pose to 
individual freedom. But few have 
highlighted their relative inefficiency. 
Indeed, if the right to security is one of 
the founding reasons for political 
government and one of its main sources 
of legitimacy, can states still guarantee 
this basic right? This article examines this 
dilemma and focuses more specifically on 
its implications for the notion and practice 
of sovereignty. It also sketches a strong, 
but nuanced, rescue of sovereignty at the 
European level in order to assure 
individual security while, at the same 
time, protecting our freedoms. 
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moved by passions such as competition, 
mistrust and desire for glory that will, if they are 
not impeded by an external agent, lead to war. 
The only way to tame these natural tendencies is 
by a rational acceptance of a common power 
protecting them all in exchange for a 
renunciation of part of their individual liberty.2  
This guarantee of personal security is one of the 
defining features of states’ sovereignty. If this 
notion entails various dimensions, its coercive 
aspect has always been essential to its existence. 
Even the ability to adopt legislations on a 
particular territory – perceived by Jean Bodin as 
the distinctive characteristic of sovereignty3 – 
cannot be said to grant effective sovereign 
power to a particular entity if it is not backed up 
by a potential use of force against those who 
violate the rules elaborated by the sovereign. In 
other words: the ability of public authorities to 
implement decisions on a given territory needs 
to be supported by a legitimate monopoly of the 
use of force. But, furthermore, the core of 
sovereignty – its coercive dimension – is also 
one of its most primary sources of legitimacy, 
since it gives public authorities the means to 
guarantee individual security. Without this 
dimension, individuals would never accept the 
renunciation of some of their freedoms to a 
central authority.  
Historically, however, sovereign rulers then also 
started to derive their legitimacy from the 
guarantee of other basic freedoms – such as 
freedom of speech, expression and organization 
–, from the democratic elaboration of public 
decisions and from the principles of the rule of 
law.4 The latter not only established checks and 
balances and controls on the sovereign ruler 
himself, but also reinforced the protection of 
particular human rights. Even more recently, 
sovereign powers also included the ability to 
implement socio-economic interventions in 
order to mitigate economic crises and 
inequalities, thereby adding another, very 
powerful, element of ‘output’ legitimacy to the 
decisions implemented by the state. The 
identity-based rhetoric that justified – sometimes 
simultaneously and sometimes a posteriori – the 
extension and reconfiguration of sovereign 
powers is, on the other hand, not related to 
actual sovereign powers as such. Indeed, 
nationalism, as a general doctrine rather than a 
fully fledged ideology, was always a way of 
legitimizing particular political actions rather 
than a specific interpretation of them.5 Thus, 
this symbolic dimension of sovereignty has 
never enhanced the content of the latter, but 
merely contributed to justifying it. 
In practice, at least in the West, states have 
constituted the crystallisation of these layers of 
sovereignty on a particular territory: they 
became the holder of various competences that 
they could apply on a particular territory. With 
the process of democratization and the building 
of the welfare state, the source and area on 
which their sovereign power applied was 
expanded and transformed. At the same time, 
their source of legitimacy started residing as 
much in their link with the majority will (‘input’) 
as in the actual policies they implemented on 
their territory (the ‘output’). With the triumph of 
liberalism and the rule of law, states had also 
become the main guarantors of fundamental 
rights, including against their own actions. And 
most of the time a strong national identity was 
used as one of the legitimizing tools for the 
implementation of political action by the 
sovereign.  
THE SLOW DEMISE OF NATIONAL 
SOVEREIGNTIIES  
Nonetheless, national sovereignty has slowly 
been undermined in its various dimensions, and 
European integration is partly the cause. In an 
increasing number of fields, an incomplete 
Europeanisation has weakened national 
sovereignty without creating the bases for a 
properly European sovereignty. For instance, 
the liberalisation of the exchanges of goods, 
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services and capitals without harmonisation of 
social, tax and environmental standards has 
generated a ‘race to the bottom’ limiting the 
ability of social and political actors to act upon 
the level of these standards. Similarly, the 
creation of a common currency and financial 
institution was done without the support of a 
substantial budget which could offset the huge 
divergences between regions and states within 
the eurozone or fund demand-friendly 
investments. This partial Europeanisation also 
concerns immigration: the free movement of 
persons within Schengen has not yet been 
accompanied by a clear management of external 
borders. Member States have therefore lost the 
control over their own borders without being 
able to rely on an adequate European control 
over the EU’s external borders. As for 
democratic sovereignty, it has been more than 
troubled by European integration: more and 
more policies are being decided, directly or 
indirectly, at the European level, whereas 
political debates, media and public spaces – 
‘politics’ – still take place at the national level. 
This discrepancy is one of the root causes for 
the loss of effectiveness experienced by national 
democracies. However, the EU decision-making 
procedure is still far from corresponding to the 
criteria of representative democracy: while the 
European Parliament is still not entitled to 
propose new legislations, the European 
Commission is still very far from being fully 
accountable to the legislative. Another example 
of this half-way Europeanisation and of its 
detrimental impact on national sovereignties 
concerns the military and police forces: Europol 
and the Common Security and Defence policy 
still constitute hybrid entities, partly 
intergovernmental and partly supranational, 
rather than proper European entities. And yet, 
national security institutions no longer seem fit 
to deal with current threats.  
Let us now take a closer look at the coercive 
aspect of sovereignty – as noted earlier, the 
minimal and sine qua non condition for its 
effectiveness as well as its legitimacy – in the 
light of the current context.  
SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY ?  
The recent terrorist attacks in Paris and the one 
against the magazine Charlie Hebdo a year ago 
have blatantly revealed the fact that European 
citizens are no longer safe in their own 
countries. The terrorist menace is the new 
security threats faced by European populations. 
The discussion on the multifaceted causes of 
these threats is a complex and ongoing one that 
we will not tackle here. The point that we seek 
to address instead is their impact, on the one 
hand, on the fundamental right to peace that 
every citizen should enjoy and, on the other, on 
the actual effectiveness of sovereignty in one of 
its founding aspects, namely, the coercive one.  
Currently, the debate seems to be split into two 
camps, particularly in France: on the one hand, 
those who are ready to give up fundamental 
freedoms, temporarily and in the long run, in 
exchange for a proposed increase in personal 
and collective security at the national level, and 
on the other, those who point to the potential 
dangers of restricting such freedoms for the 
whole population.  
Let us first examine the arguments of the 
second camp. These sceptical observers are right 
to highlight the risks entailed in drastically 
limiting basic human freedoms. In that respect, 
possible dangers are exemplified by the French 
government project to strip of their nationality 
any bi-national French citizens who have 
committed terrorist acts. Such a constitutional 
change – aside from being merely symbolic and 
totally inefficient in struggling against terrorism 
– would lead to many problems, including that 
of creating two categories of French citizens and 
therefore institutionalising discrimination. The 
state of emergency put in place just after the 
attack last November and due to last until the 
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end of next February has also triggered 
numerous criticisms. The willingness of the 
French government to make some of these 
measures permanent through legislative change 
has also generated substantial worries. This 
scheme proposes an increased use of ministerial 
orders – passed by the executive rather than by 
the legislative power – which means that the 
penal law will depart from the realm of 
democratic rule. Furthermore, this draft project 
gives priority to the prosecutor over the 
judiciary judge and increases the coercive 
powers of the administrative police, including 
the prefect, under the control of administrative 
jurisdictions such as the Conseil d’Etat.6 As far as 
the police are concerned, the consequences of 
these proposed changes comprise relaxing the 
rules applied to the firing of weapons, enabling 
night-time raids and loosening limitations on 
searching and detaining suspected terrorists.7 
These measures are consistent with the ones 
taken just after the attack against Charlie Hebdo 
and before that, of new penal legal frameworks 
such as Perben II. These reforms would 
certainly create an imbalance between the 
political and the judiciary powers, thereby 
opening the door to arbitrariness, the abuse of 
powers and ultimately, potential violations of 
basic human rights.  
A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE BUT 
INEFFICIENT MEANS  
Such measures could, at first glance, indicate the 
survival of sovereignty at the national level, at 
least in its coercive dimension. This is what the 
first camp welcomes: the strengthening of the 
coercive dimension of sovereignty in order to 
guarantee individual and collective security. Carl 
Schmitt, another, more recent theorist of 
sovereignty, defined the latter as the power to 
make and implement ultimate decisions in times 
of exception; and of course this power 
presupposed the ability to use force to back up 
such decisions. What some states, and the 
French one in particular, are doing with the 
explicit aim of reassuring their citizens, seems to 
confirm this Schmittian aspect of sovereignty.8 
Nonetheless, as many observers have 
mentioned, those emergency measures are more 
likely to decrease individual freedoms than to 
increase security. The threats these measures are 
targeting are indeed inherently European and 
trans-national. Deprived of practical 
effectiveness, it is difficult to maintain that 
sovereignty still exists, even in its purely coercive 
aspect. 
The solution is not, however, to merely lament 
the dangers such measures entail for individual 
freedoms, but to elaborate and implement ways 
of actually guaranteeing citizens’ security. Yet, it 
seems impossible to guarantee the security of 
citizens with purely national means. Recent 
attempts to revive the control of national 
borders and guarantee the security of citizens 
only through national means are bound to fail, 
particularly since they are likely to be 
implemented only in a partial way – for instance, 
the renationalization of the control of borders 
without adequate intelligence, police or military 
means. A lot of these attempts are actually 
political and cosmetic reactions imbued with a 
nationalist ethos, rather than credible solutions 
to the problem at hand.  
 
FOR A EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO 
SECURITY CHALLENGES  
 
The response must therefore take place directly 
at the European level. An adequate control on 
the external borders of the EU has to be 
implemented. In this respect, the Commission 
has taken a step in the right direction with its 
recent proposal to establish a European Border 
and Coast Guard to ensure a strong and shared 
management of the external borders and to 
introduce systematic checks against relevant 
databases for all people entering or exiting the 
Schengen area. As European Commission First 
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Vice-President Frans Timmermans put it: “In an 
area of free movement without internal borders, managing 
Europe’s external borders must be a shared 
responsibility. The crisis has exposed clear weaknesses 
and gaps in existing mechanisms aimed at making sure 
that EU standards are upheld. Therefore, it is now time 
to move to a truly integrated system of border 
management.9”  
 
Moreover, a distinct, common European police 
force should be created. Europol now falls 
under the ordinary decision-making procedure 
but the commission shares the right of initiative 
with Member States, unanimity is maintained 
and the Parliament is only consulted. We also 
need a proper European Defence and Security 
policy. If the Lisbon Treaty goes a step further 
in the Europeanisation of this policy – through 
the mutual assistance and solidarity clause and 
the application of enhanced and structured 
cooperation to this field and through other 
means – it still remains partly intergovernmental 
in its content. There is still no European army, 
only civilian and military capacities provided by 
the Member States. The decision-making 
procedure detailed in the Lisbon Treaty is also 
only partly intergovernmental – decisions still 
require the unanimity of Member States after 
propositions by the high representative for 
foreign affairs and security policy and the 
European Parliament have been consulted. Yet, 
it is only by a deeper Europeanisation of security 
policies – in the broad sense – that the 
individual security of all EU citizens will be 
guaranteed. Finally, a European intelligence 
agency – similar to the US CIA – must be put in 
place, as several actors have demanded.10  
Governments and civil societies should accept 
that traditional sovereign powers have, in 
practice, lost much of their effectiveness. The 
only way to guarantee one of the oldest rights of 
all, the right to internal peace and security, is 
indeed by rehabilitating sovereign authority, but 
at the European level.11 Was it not the longing 
for peace, which, in the first place, triggered the 
creation of the European Community? Why not 
reactivate this objective as one of the main 
sources of legitimacy for European integration? 
A EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY 
SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTERESTS 
OF CITIZENS  
If one is to generate a proper European 
sovereignty, however, it should be done by 
retaining the best of this notion and reality, 
without reproducing its potential dangers. 
Concerning the coercive dimension of 
sovereignty, this means that the creation of a 
European police, army, border management and 
intelligence services – provided with adequate 
resources – should go hand in hand with a 
democratisation of the EU decision-making 
process as well as with the implementation of 
the rule of law at the European level.  
Certainly, many Europeanist scholars and 
experts have insisted on the ‘sui generis’ character 
of EU governance, highlighting that if it is 
democratic, it is only so in a new, horizontal, 
post-national and postmodern way. According 
to such a mantra, the EU decision-making 
procedures are not anti-democratic but rather 
represent a further and more advanced step in 
democracy. This argument is problematic in 
many ways.12 In order to be democratic, the EU 
should be radically reformed. Chiefly, the 
European Parliament, the only European entity 
endowed with democratic legitimacy, should 
have the only right of initiative and should 
control the executive – a transformed 
Commission – which would derive from the 
political majority represented in the Parliament. 
And in order to become a democratic entity – in 
the minimal sense of representative democracy – 
the EU should be led less by the will of its 
Member States. This means that the Council and 
the European Council would, ultimately, 
disappear. In this dimension as in several others, 
sovereignty cannot be shared. If it is shared, it 
becomes divided and, in the end, ceases to exist. 
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Moreover, sharing sovereignty inevitably triggers 
fragmentation and seditions, sometimes violent 
ones, that tend to recreate the unity of 
sovereignty at other levels.13  
On the question of the rule of law, it is 
important to mention that the current treaties 
(Article 7, TUE) allow the Council to act with a 
preventive mechanism or with possible 
sanctions if a Member State breaches the rule of 
law principles.14 Nonetheless, this article has 
never been used. Confronted with this situation, 
the Commission has so far only exerted political 
pressure or launched infringement 
proceedings.15 Besides, one can question the fact 
that control of compliance to the rule of law is 
granted to governments and to an unelected 
entity such as the Commission – in the 
procedure foreseen by Article 7, the European 
Parliament would only be consulted – rather 
than by an independent judicial authority. One 
can also wonder whether the actual content of 
these principles – which include the 
fundamental rights – should not be discussed 
and voted on by a democratic assembly before 
being enshrined in a fundamental text, such as a 
constitution. In this matter as in many others, 
the general concepts and terminology of liberal 
democracy are applied to the EU, while, in 
practice, this hybrid entity is very far from 
corresponding to this classical model. However, 
shouldn’t the EU respect the rule of law 
principles itself before pretending to control 
them in individual Member States? 
More generally, it is essential, in promoting 
sovereignty at the European level, to avoid the 
dangers revealed by the historical evolutions of 
national sovereignty. As Jürgen Habermas 
famously put it, the nation state, presenting a 
‘Janus face’, was historically justified by very 
antagonistic principles.16 More precisely, there is 
a strong tension between the universalistic 
aspect of citizenship and the particularistic 
dimension of ‘conventional’ forms of patriotism. 
A European sovereignty, if it ever came about, 
should not be justified by communitarian 
arguments – for instance, by a defence of 
European identity going hand in hand with an 
exclusivist discourse against some specific 
‘others’.17 Not only would this be potentially 
detrimental to individual freedoms and lead to 
many delusions, it is also totally unnecessary.18 
There are indeed numerous, more instrumental, 
arguments to promote the creation of properly 
European sovereign powers. This is, in the end, 
in the interest of every European resident. For 
‘every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns 
what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which 
is death.’.19 This right to security, however, should 
always be guaranteed within an institutional 
framework that preserves basic individual 
freedoms, rather than being used as a pretext to 
serve the will of a minority to dominate over 
others. As liberal thinkers have highlighted since 
at least the nineteenth century, absolute 
sovereignty can go against freedom. And it is 
not enough to democratize political 
government, because if this guarantees ‘positive 
freedom’, the latter can go against ‘negative 
freedom’: ‘If I wish to preserve my liberty, it is not 
enough to say that it must not be violated unless someone 
or other – the absolute ruler or the popular assembly . . . 
– authorizes its violation. I must establish a society in 
which there must be some frontiers of freedom which 
nobody should be permitted to cross.’20  
Democracy should not be an end in itself but 
merely a means to the preservation of individual 
freedoms. More generally, sovereignty has to be 
at the service of every citizen’s interest to 
effective freedom. Nowadays, the only way to 
preserve and enhance our freedoms is by 
creating a strong, but nuanced and checked, 
European sovereignty. Political and 
philosophical liberalism can provide us with the 
intellectual means to conceptualise sovereignty 
at the European level in its more progressive 
aspects – democratic and socio-economic – 
while taming it in its more harmful – cultural 
and coercive – dimensions. For that purpose, 
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renewing the tradition of European federalism 
would be both conceptually and practically 
fruitful.  
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